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Abstract

Based on an ongoing attempt to integrate Natural Language instructions with human
gure animation, we demonstrate that agents' understanding and use of instructions can
complement what they can derive from the environment in which they act. We focus on
two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior { their intentions and their expectations
{ and shown how Natural Language instructions contribute to such attitudes in ways that
complement the environment. We also show that instructions can require more than one
context of interpretation and thus that agents' understanding of instructions can evolve as
their activity progresses. A signi cant consequence is that Natural Language understanding
in the context of behavior cannot simply be treated as \front end" processing, but rather
must be integrated more deeply into the processes that guide an agent's behavior and
respond to its perceptions.

1 Introduction
This is a short position paper on what we have learned about language, behavior and the
environment from an ongoing attempt to use Natural Language instructions to guide the taskrelated behavior of animated human gures. While the project, AnimNL (for \Animation and
Natural Language") is not yet ready to deliver a prototype, we believe that what we have so far
learned from this attempt to produce a complete vertical integration from language to animated
behavior will be of interest and benet to others as well.
AnimNL builds upon the JackTM animation system developed at the University of Pennsylvania's Computer Graphics Research Laboratory. In Jack, animation follows from model-based
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and Xinmin Zhao, all of whom have contributed greatly to the current version of AnimNL. We would also like
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supported by ARO Grant DAAL03-89-C-0031 including participation by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory
(Aberdeen), Natick Laboratory, and the Institute for Simulation and Training U.S. Air Force DEPTH contract
through Hughes Missile Systems F33615-91-C-0001 DMSO through the University of Iowa National Defense
Science and EngineeringGraduate Fellowship in Computer Science DAAL03-92-G-0342 NSF Grant IRI91-17110,
CISE Grant CDA88-22719, and Instrumentationand LaboratoryImprovementProgram Grant USE-9152503, and
DARPA grant N00014-90-J-186.
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Harcopy version has picture of SodaJack
Figure 1: Animated Jack Agent
simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment. The agents of primary interest are Jack's
biomechanically reasonable and anthropometrically-scaled human models (see Figure 1). The
models have 138 joints, including an accurate torso, and a growing repertoire of naturalistic
behaviors such as walking, stepping, looking, reaching, turning, grasping, strength-based lifting,
and both obstacle and self-collision avoidance 5]. Each of these behaviors is environmentally
reactive. That is, incremental computation is able to adjust an agent's performance to the situation, as the situation progresses, without further involvement of the higher level processes 10]
unless an exceptional failure condition is signaled. Dierent limits can be placed on an agent's
vision, strength and comfort threshold, for more realistic environmental response, and dierent
environments can easily be constructed, so as to vary the situations in which the gures are
acting.1
With these features, we believe that Jack can provide a fairly realistic target for linking
Natural Language with behavior. This is because Jack agents \naturally" face limits on their
ability to understand Natural Language utterances, much as people do: their ability to understand language relies on their knowledge, their knowledge is mediated by what they can perceive,
and their perception is limited. Moreover, since Jack agents can, like people, eect changes on
their world, their understanding of language can evolve through intentional activity in the world
(cf. Section 2).
From our work with Jack, what we have been led to believe about language, behavior and
the environment is that
Just as an agent may be motivated by its environment to consider adopting particular
goals as intentions that will guide it subsequent behavior, so an agent may also be motivated by Natural Language instructions. Moreover, goals recognized as being situationally
relevant either through perceiving the environment or processing instructions, can clarify
the meaning of other instructions. (Human and Laird 32] see a similar complementarity
of roles between language and the environment in an agent's acquisition of procedural
knowledge.)
Just as an agent uses its perception of the current environment to augment its knowledge
and guide its current behavior, so too can an agent use expectations derived from instructions about how a situation will evolve, to augment its beliefs and guide its current and
future behavior.

1 In discussing agents, we will use the pronoun \he", since we will be using a male gure in our illustrated
example | i.e., a gure with male body proportions. The Jack animation system provides anthropometrically
sizable female gures as well.
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Intentions and expectations can complement one another. Intentions can embody an agent's
expectations that the agent can act in ways to satisfy those intentions, while expectations can
lead an agent to form intentions to check that those expectations are satised and to take
corrective actions if not.
Three caveats are necessary here: one involving the quality of everyday instructions, a second
involving the sources of an agent's intentions, and a third involving the existence of a distinct
\instructor".
First, the task of formulating instructions is clearly not without problems for human language
users, as the prevalence of incomprehensible and/or useless instructions shows. Two of our own
favorites are:
\Replace items on vehicle with items contained in this kit." (ANCO Replacement
Windshield-Washer Pump, Stock No. 61-14)
\To access the next highest programmed station setting, or to switch to a lower programmed station, the SCAN buttons must be repeatedly pressed." (VCR, Mitsubishi
Electronics)
There are many possible things to blame for the prevalance of poor instructions, including (1)
the prevalence of poor writing, in general (2) a writer's inability to be too specic, because
they lack detailed knowledge of the exact situation in which the task will be carried out and
(3) the diculty people have in converting narrative accounts of past behavior or experience
into eective instructions for future behavior. (Recall, for example, the joke about the bus rider
who asks a fellow passenger where he should get o for City Hall. The latter replies, \Just get
o one stop before I do".)
While signicant work is being done to improve the quality of instructions 3, 25, 17, 45, 46],
in the end, one may have to accept that no xed instruction set can serve all agents in all
situations.
Secondly, real agents will always have additional intentions that come from sources other
than instructions: intentions arise from personal goals and desires, as well as from the policies
(social, governmental, etc.) an agent agrees to adhere to. However, we have simplied the
situation to one of semi-autonomous agents who have no other intentions than those that follow
from their given instructions. This does not mean, however, that nothing else inuences their
behavior. Since Jack agents are environmentally reactive, features in the changing environment
aect their behavior as well. For example, an agent instructed to go to the door may also have
to take action to avoid obstacles it nds blocking its way. In future work, we plan to address
instructions that convey general policy, and to allow it to aect agent behavior as well. For
animated agent behavior that follows from particular personality traits, the reader is referred
to work by Bates et al. 9, 37] and by Morawetz 14].
Thirdly, in real life there is often no distinct instructor around. In the case of multi-person
tasks, this means the conduct of a task is often a product of negotiation by the participants,
3

each with their own knowledge and beliefs 29, 47]. The intentions and expections of any one of
them then may then reect what has been negotiated by the group. We argue though that the
situation with a distinct instructor can show more simply that instructions can allow an agent
to form beliefs about the world that it can act on with relative condence.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss plans and instructions
in general, as well as some related work. We also give a brief overview of AnimNL, in support
of the points we will be making about instructions, intentions and expectations. Intentions are
then discussed in Section 3, and Expectations in Section 4.

2 Background

2.1 Plans and Instructions
Early views of Natural Language instructions corresponded to the early views of plans: instructions were treated as specifying nodes of a plan that, when completely expanded into primitive
action specications, would control agent behavior. This view, for example, underlies SHRDLU's
successful response to instructions such as \Pick up the green pyramid and put it in the box"
54].
That plans should not be viewed as control structures has already been well argued by Agre
and Chapman 1], Pollack 42], Suchman 48], and others in the eld. Agre and Chapman show
that when people form plans in response to instructions, they appear to use those plans as
resources. The actual task situation may then lead them to interpolate additional actions not
mentioned in the instructions, to replace actions specied in the instructions with other ones
that seem better suited to the situation, and to ground referring terms as a consequence of their
actions rather than as a precondition for them. Other researchers, working in what has come
to be called a BDI framework (\beliefs, desires and intentions") now view planning in terms of
agents adopting (and dropping) intentions to act 13, 16, 29, 43].
A plan's relationship with a set of instructions is also not rigid. It depends, inter alia on
various features of the instructions, including:
whether the instructions convey doctrine (general policy regarding behavior in some range
of situations) or procedure (actions to be taken now or at some specied time in the future)
in the case of procedural instructions, whether they are given before, during, or after action
whether the instructions are meant as advice, suggestion, order, request, warning, or tutorial.
These features are apparent in recent work involving instructed agents. For example, in Chapman's work 15], instructions are given as advice to agents already engaged in an activity. They
are treated as additional evidence for an action alternative already identied by the agent as being relevant to the current situation. That alternative may not, however, be taken immediately
4

(or ever) if other alternatives have more evidence in their favor. Chapman derives this view
from observing how arcade game players follow instructions given to them by kibbitzers watching them play. (Chapman also notes that negative instructions can be similarly understood as
evidence against actions.)
Vere and Bickmore treat most instructions to their \basic agent", Homer, as orders to carry
out specic tasks 50]. However, they have also enabled Homer to interpret negative instructions
as policy that can override orders that conict with it. They give an example in which Homer
(a small submarine) is told not to leave its island, and it subsequently refuses to comply with
an instruction to take a picture of the Codsh (a ship) because to do so would require leaving
the island.
Work by Alterman and his students 2] shows how instructions given after an incorrect action
has been performed are treated as assistance, helping agents to accommodate their existing
routines to the device currently at hand. In this approach, routines evolved over many dierent
instances of engagement help focus an agent on the details of the situation that require attention
and on the decisions that must be made. Instructions may interrupt activity to call attention
to other relevant details or decisions, or to correct decisions already made. Neither plans nor
instructions function as control structures that determine the agent's behavior.
Our own work has focussed on procedural instructions given to agents before undertaking a
task. Such intructions can be found in user's manuals, owner's manuals, maintenance manuals,
and \how to" books { for example,
Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag. (Royal CAN VACTM
Owner's Manual, p. 5.)
Remove safety wire from access unit adjusting bolt and adjusting link and loosen bolt. (Air
Force Manual T.O.IF-16C-2-94JG-50-2, Ammunition Drum, Removal and Installation)
If candle wax falls on a piece of furniture, wait until it solidies, then pick it o with your
ngernail or a plastic spatula. (McGowan & DuBern, Home Repair. London: Dorling
Kindersley Ltd. 1991, p. 22.)
One application that could benet from the ability to understand and animate agent behavior
that would follow from such instructions is task analysis in connection with Computer-Aided
Design. By enabling virtual human agents to carry out maintenance and repair tasks in the
CAD environment itself, a designer could determine before the artifacts were built whether
people would be able to carry out those tasks in anticipated environments.
There are at least three ways to make dierent virtual agents interact with objects in dierent
virtual environments. One way is through direct manipulation, which would require a designer
to directly control a range of dierent agents in a range of dierent environments, in order
to observe and evaluate their behavior. A second way is through direct motion sensing (e.g.
\Virtual Reality" kinesthetic input 4]). The third way is through Natural Language level
5

instructions. This could be the most economical, since it would allow the designer to simply
\rerun" the same instructions with dierent agent-environment pairs, in order to accomplish
the same ends.
Other potential application areas for using instructions to direct the behavior of animated
agents include group training activities and multi-agent simulations. Thus we feel that enabling
virtual human agents to understand instructions is of practical as well as theoretical interest.

2.2 Overview of the AnimNL Architecture
We begin with a brief overview of the AnimNL architecture, since it captures our beliefs that
language understanding is a process that evolves, in part, through principled interaction with
the world. Roughly speaking, AnimNL consists of three interacting modules:
A module consisting of processes that work towards understanding an instruction step in
terms of an initial structure of intentions, which we call a plan graph. These processes
include parsing, interpretation and plan inference 18, 19, 20, 21].
A module consisting of a high-level incremental planner and two specialized processes able
to adapt highly-parameterized plans for search and for object manipulation to the exact
situation at hand 26, 27, 28, 36, 41].
A simulator that coordinates motion directives and perceptual requests from the planning
components with ones corresponding to environmental responses, and schedules their performance. An agenda allows multiple behaviors to be carried out in parallel, and other
behaviors to be initiated and terminated asynchronously with respect to each other 10].
The result is that an agent's behavior at any time reects both its low-level responses to the current environment and the current state of its high-level intentions. A more detailed description
of the AnimNL architecture can be found in 53].

3 Intentions from Instructions
Intentions have been identied as a factor in rational behavior by various researchers (e.g.,
12, 13, 15, 42]), who see them as playing at least two roles: (1) they can constrain the courses
of action an agent need consider to those consistent with what the agent already plans to do and
(2) they can be used to determine when an action can be said to be relevant, to have succeeded
or to have failed.
We have found that goals specied in instructions { which, in the case of positive instructions,
are goals that agents are being ordered or advised or requested to adopt as their intentions {
can also aect (1) how an agent interprets action descriptions in those instructions and (2) how
the agent behaves in carrying out actions. In the rst case, instructions perform a role that
Chapman's PhD thesis 15] shows can also be performed by the environment. In Chapman's
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work, apparently underspecied instructions are interpreted simply as evidence for a response
to the current environment that has already been deemed relevant on the basis of perception.
Therefore, if a knife can be used either to kill a monster or to jimmy a door, and if a monster
is threatening the agent and no door needs to be jimmied (e.g., to enable the agent to escape),
an instruction such as \use the knife" will be understood only as advice to kill the monster.
In Section 3.1, we show how goals specied in Natural Language instructions can function
in a similar way, and in Section 3.2, we comment on how intentions derived from instructions
can aect low-level behavioral features. We conclude in Section 3.3 with a brief discussion on
how the action representation used in AnimNL allows its high-level planner to use intentions
eectively.

3.1 Behavioral Import of Purpose Clauses
Comments are often made about the eciency of Natural Language | how much of an utterance's meaning can be left unspecied, to be lled in by listeners able to draw on an appropriate
context. In this light, we have come to understand that purpose clauses | innitival clauses
that convey the goal of an action { provide a helpful source of information for understanding
underspecied action descriptions which convey information implicitly through context. While
this information could of course be made explicit, people seem not to expect this: speakers
commonly leave it for hearers to gure out for themselves.2
Consider the following example (from 18]):
Place a plank between two ladders to make a simple scaold.
The action description in the main clause is \place a plank between two ladders". The goal
conveyed in the purpose clause is \make a simple scaold". Now, by itself, the main clause
conveys no explicit constraints on the orientation of what have to be two step-ladders and only
one constraint on the placement of the plank { that it be somewhere in the 3-dimensional space
\between" wherever the step-ladders are. However there are signicant implicit constraints that
follow from the purpose of making a simple scaold: the ladders should be aligned with their
treads facing outwards in opposite directions, at a distance spannable by the plank, which should
be placed horizontally on treads of the two ladders that are the same height o the ground. (How
high o the ground will depend on the purpose of the scaold: it is not determinable from the
given instruction alone.) An (incremental) plan can then be formulated to comply with both
the explicit and implicit contraints on the procedure and its intended result.
There are, of course, other linguistic means of conveying purpose { free adjuncts 52], means clauses 7, 8],
and even simple conjunction 24]. Moreover, clauses that convey purpose do serve other functions as well, such
as making an action description easier to understand 22, 23] or justifying why an action should be done 8]. Our
point here is simply that any linguistic specication of goals (purpose clauses being a clear example) can serve,
like the environment, as the context in which an underspeci ed action description can be elaborated and thereby
correctly understood.
2
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Our second example is intended to show that an agent can use a goal expression and perceptual tests on when that goal is achieved to determine the referent of a noun phrase and hence
what action he or she is meant to carry out. The instruction to be considered is:
Vacuum the rug or carpet against the direction of the pile to leave it raised.
To follow this instruction, an agent must know the direction referred to as \against the direction
of the pile". If the agent does not know the referent of this phrase before starting, the purpose
clause (\to leave it raised") can be used to guide his or her search for it. That is, the agent can
plan to vacuum a bit in various directions and observe which the direction of sweep leaves the
pile raised. At this point, the agent can begin to elaborate a plan for vacuuming the entire rug
or carpet in that direction and thereby nish the job.
A further example is related to a matter we return to in Section 4, and concerns the termination conditions associated with perceptual tests. (The instructions are for removing wine
stains from a rug or carpet.)
Blot with clean tissues to remove any liquid still standing. Sprinkle liberally with
salt to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric. Vacuum up the salt.
In the rst sentence, blotting with clean tissues species a type of activity but not the extent
to which it should be pursued. (In the terminology of Moens and Steedman 40], it is simply
a process like \running", not a culminated process like \running a mile": it has no intrinsic
endpoint.) How long an agent should blot the stained area comes from the purpose clause \to
remove any liquid still standing": the agent should plan to interleave blotting with perception,
until no standing liquid is left visible.
The purpose clause in the second sentence conveys in a somewhat dierent way the condition
under which the agent can start the nal step, vacuuming up the salt. It is not the termination
point of the sprinkling (which is terminated when the agent decides there is now a \liberal"
amount of salt on the stain 34]), but that of the subsequent waiting. How long the agent should
wait comes from the purpose clause \to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric". The
agent must plan to interleave waiting with perception, continuing until he perceives that the
salt is damp (i.e., a change in visual texture). At this point, the salt has extracted as much
liquid as it can, and the agent can commence vacuuming.
This example illustrates the complementary relation between intention and expectation: the
intention to remove the standing liquid leads to an expectation that blotting it will eventually
accomplish this removal, which in turn leads to an intention to observe the situation, monitoring
for the expected point at which no liquid will be left standing.
To say the above is not to say that an agent's only intentions are those derived from instructions, but rather that goals specied in instructions, which the agent may adopt as intentions,
can provide a context for fully understanding underspecied action description in instructions.
Di Eugenio has designed and implemented the machinery to be used in AnimNL for computing many of the inferences that follow from understanding that the action described in
8

the main clause of an utterance is being done for the purpose  described in a purpose clause.
This relationship between and  can be characterized more specically as either generation or
enablement. In generation, executing under appropriate circumstances is all that is required
to achieve . In enablement, brings about circumstances in which  can be generated by
subsequent actions.
Di Eugenio's approach makes use of both linguistic knowledge and planning knowledge. A
knowledge base of plan schemata (or recipes) complements a taxonomic structure of action
descriptions. The latter is represented in Classic 11] and exploits classication to allow an
inference algorithm to nd related action descriptions. These descriptions index into the knowledge base of recipes which includes information about generation, enablement and sub-structure
relationships between actions. The inference algorithms on these linked structures are described
in detail in 18, 19].
An instruction may convey to the agent that a generation or enablement relationship holds
between two actions, without the agent being able to determine which one, from the text alone.
This may lead to confusion when the agent comes to act on the instruction. For example, recall
the Royal CAN VAC instruction given in Section 2.1:
Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag.
(This is from a procedure for replacing the dust bag when it is full.) Whether a generation
or enablement relation holds between \depressing the button" and \opening the door" will
depend simply on the orientation of the canister. If the canister is horizontal when the button
is depressed and the catch released, the door will fall open of its own accord because of gravity.
In this case, depressing the button will generate opening the door, without the need for further
action. If however, the agent has up-ended the canister to make the button more accessible,
depressing the button will just release the catch: the agent must still grasp the door and pull it
open. An agent who expected the former may think he didn't press the button hard enough and
try again, rather than think an additional action was called for. Although this is a relatively
trivial example, readers will probably recognize the problem. It could be solved by making the
instruction more specic:
Holding canister horizontally, depress door release button to open door and expose
paper bag.
However, making the text longer seems to decrease the likelihood that it will be read. Trying
to convey the information graphically 25] relies on the reader distinguishing between necessary
features of the depicted scene and accidental ones. This suggests that producing instructions of
guaranteed reliability may be an impossible task.

3.2 Intentions and Behavioral Features
In the previous section, we distinguished two relations, generation and enablement, holding
between an action and its current purpose. Viewing purpose in terms of an agent's intention to
9

achieve it, we now discuss the need we have discovered, to take account of that intention when
computing low-level features of the action to be performed and animated. Such features may
include the place at which the agent locates itself to perform the action, and the manner in
which it grasps an object involved in the action or moves it. While our current implementation
of this capability is simply via table look-up, a more general and extensible solution is being
pursued 36] for a wide class of object manipulation tasks. In the meanwhile, we believe it is
still worthwhile to illustrate the phenomenon, if only by example, since such a dierence can be
made to human gure animation by a gure's carrying out a task-related action \naturally",
even when particular behavioral choices are not necessary to simply the success of the specied
action.
Our rst example involves the region in which an object will be grasped. If a hammer is
to be grasped simply to enable it to be moved from place to place, any region of the hammer
is a viable grasp location, although somewhere near its center of mass may make it easier for
the agent to lift and transport. If however, the hammer is to be grasped to enable its use in
hammering a nail, a more appropriate grasp region would be towards the end of its shank. Even
then, re-orientation may be required, once the hammer is lifted.
Our second example involves constraints on an agent's target in moving to a location. Consider the simple instruction
Go over to the mirror.
By itself, this tells an agent little about where he or she is supposed to end up being positioned
with respect to the mirror. On the other hand, specifying a goal that will be enabled by reaching
a target location can help an agent to better identify that location. For example,
Go over to the mirror and straighten it.
Go over to the mirror and straighten your bow tie.3
Straightening a mirror requires manipulating it, so an agent will target a comfortable arm's
reach. Straightening one's bow tie requires seeing oneself clearly: this may target a location
either closer to or further away from the mirror, depending on the agent's eyesight. Note that
the instructor may not know enough about the agent to specify a target location in more detail:
it is something that only the agent can determine. Thus no further explicit guidance can be
provided.
The capabilities of our existing implementation are demonstrated in an animated simulation
of \SodaJack", a soda fountain agent who can respond to requests for a soda or ice cream 28].
In this domain, the intention to perform a basic task action such as moving a glass so as to
generate serving it to a \customer", posts a constraint on the agent's movements that the glass
not be tipped to one side. On the other hand, moving a glass so as to enable wiping it o posts
no such constraint. While a few simple things such as these can be done by table look-up, the
3 These are examples of purposive \and", mentioned earlier in footnote 2 and discussed in more detail in 24].
The \and" form sounds more natural here than the \to" form.
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problem of systematically characterizing those features of intended actions that aect low-level
physical activity is of considerable diculty. While the signicance of this boundary between
symbol and action has been recognized and formalized in 33], much more work is needed in
order to actually cross it.

3.3 Intentions in Means/End Reasoning
Given that instructions only convey certain features of an agent's behavior, situated decision
making is necessary to expand and amplify the agent's intentions, to ll in gaps. To enable
decision making to use an agent's intentions eectively, we have found it worth replacing xed
set of preconditions, with reasoning about the eects of actions in the context in which they will
be performed.
This reects our analysis of preconditions 27] as encoding claims about the universal desirability or undesirability of certain eects of an action. For example, failing to clear o a block
before picking it up, may mean that objects on top of it will slide o and break or disturb other
objects. Sometimes an agent will be concerned about this possibility other times, not. (We
assume that agents may desire to avoid particular actions or actions that may lead to particular
states.) The problem with xed preconditions is that they prevent an agent from considering
an action, even if the agent doesn't care about its possibly destructive side-eects.
Limited simulation, on the other hand, can enable an agent to reason roughly about the
eects of performing an action in a given world state. The agent can then decide whether or not
performing the action will satisfy his intentions without violating any behavioral constraints. In
some cases, the consequences will be acceptable given the agent's current intentions, in other
cases, they won't. This use of situated reasoning through limited simulation allows the system
to use intentions to dene, in a situation-specic way, when an action is applicable and can
be successful rather than using an a priori denition. (Another use of limited simulation in
planning are discussed in 38].)
The removal of preconditions from action operators has multiple eects. One benet is to
give the system more exibility in choosing which actions to use to achieve its ends. However,
the cost of this increased exibility is that actions may fail to achieve these ends. In short, using
intentions and limited simulation to perform action selection means the possibility of action
failure must be allowed for.
The current version of AnimNL's planner, which eliminates preconditions in favor of situated
reasoning about the eects of actions, is described in more detail in 26, 27].

4 Expectations from Instructions
Here we address the role of instructions in raising expectations that complement an agent's current perceptions in inuencing its behavior. Expectations can lead to further perceptual activity
{ not just observation but also activities that enable observation. As such, expectations from
11

instructions complement the signals coming in from the outside world. Here we discuss three
types of expectations generated by dierent elements in instruction, and the \active perception"
6] they can engender.

4.1 Expectations about Processes
In some earlier work designed for creating animations from recipes, Karlin 34] analysed a
range of temporal and frequency adverbs found in instructions. One particular construction she
analysed is the following:
Do for <duration> or until <event>
e.g. Steam two minutes or until mussels open.
Karlin notes that this is not a case of logical disjunction, where the agent can choose which
disjunct to follow: rather, the explicit duration suggests the usual amount of time that it will
take to just cook the mussels. This can be detected when all the mussels that were closed when
they were put into the pot (already open ones having been discarded as dead) are now open. If
they are not open after two minutes, the agent should wait a bit longer. Those that have not
opened after another short wait should then be discarded, since they are full of mud.
The usefulness of an expectation such as this comes from the cost of sensing. Steaming is
usually done in a closed, opaque cooking pot, so the lid must be removed in order to check
the state of the contents. Whenever this is done, steam escapes, setting the process back. The
result of sensing too often then is that the mussels become tough through over-cooking. The
expectation can therefore be used to gauge how long to wait before beginning to make costly
sensing tests.

4.2 Expectations about Consequences
Processes often have more than one possible outcome, depending on how long they proceed
and how much resources they consume. Another type of expectation arising from instructions
concerns the properties of objects that will result from such processes. (This is described in
more detail in 51].)
Consider for example, mixing our, butter and water.4 Depending on the relative amounts
of these three ingredients and the absorbency of the our (dierent for dierent types of our
and for winter and summer wheat), the result may be anything from a akey mass to a viscous
batter. Instructions can indicate the intended result, so that the agent can modify and/or
augment his actions so as to produce it. How instructions convey the intended result can vary:
In Example 1a-c, the expected viscosity of the resulting mixture is conveyed through the verb:
This is not something we are capable of animating without simulating the properties of semi-viscous uids,
but it is the best example for making our point.
4
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1a. Mix the our, butter and water, and knead until smooth and shiny.
b. Mix the our, butter and water, and spread over the blueberries.
c. Mix the our, butter and water, and stir until all lumps are gone.
while in Example 2a-b, it is conveyed through the noun phrase:
2a. Mix the our, butter and water. Let the dough relax for 15 minutes.
b. Mix the our, butter and water. Let the batter sit for 15 minutes.
There are several ways in which expectations such as these can aect an agent's behavior. The
simplest is to monitor the result: if it doesn't meet the agent's expectation (too liquid or too
solid), the agent can compensate with additional amounts of our in the former case or water
in the latter. Alternatively, the agent can monitor the process: that is, he can add the specied
amount of water to the specied amounts of butter and our gradually, mixing it in. If it is
becoming too viscous, he can stop before adding all the ingredients.

4.3 Expectations about Locations
Actions can eect changes in the world that alter what an agent can perceive. Part of an
agent's cognitive task in understanding instructions is therefore to determine for each referring
expression, the perceptual context in which the agent is meant to nd (or ground) its referent.
Some referring expressions in an instruction may be intended to refer to objects in the currently
perceivable situation, while others may be intended to refer to objects that only appear (i.e.,
come into existence or become perceivable) as a consequence of carrying out an action specied
in the instruction.
The dierence can be seen by comparing the following two instructions
3a. Go into Fred's oce and get me the red le folder.
b. Go into Fred's oce and rele the red le folder.
At issue is the referent of the expression \the red le folder". In (3a), it is clearly the red le
folder that the listener will nd in Fred's oce, a le folder whose existence the listener may
previously have not been aware of. That is, (3a) leads a listener to develop the expectation that
after they perform the initial action and go into Fred's oce, they will be in a context in which
it makes sense to determine the referent of \the red le folder". In contrast, given instruction
(3b), it is reasonable for a listener to rst try to ground \the red le folder" in the context
in which the instruction is given. If successful, the listener can then go into Fred's oce and
rele it. If unsuccessful though, a listener will not just take the instruction to be infelicitous (as
they would in the case of an instruction like \Pick up the le folder", if there were currently
no le folder around). Rather they will adopt the same locational expectation as in the rst
example, that the red le folder is in Fred's oce. What is especially interesting is the strength
of this expectation: a cooperative agent will look around, if an object isn't where they expect
it to be until they nd it. This has led Moore to develop exible procedures he calls search
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plans 41] following 39], that can be used to guide an agent in grounding both denite and

indenite referring expressions. Moore's search plans are able to incorporate expectations about
the context in which a referring expression will receive its intended grounding, to limit search.
In AnimNL, Di Eugenio has attempted to derive some of these expectations through plan
inference techniques described in more detail in 19, 20]. In this case, the inferences are of the
form: if one goes to place  for the purpose of doing action , then expect to do at . If
has among its applicability conditions { conditions that must hold for to make sense, in terms
of its potential for success in the circumstances 35, 44, 49] { that one or more of its argument
be at its performance site , then a locational expectation develops as in (3a). If not, a weaker
expectation arises, as in (3b). (Notice that this can even arise on the basis of a single clause:
\Bring me the red le folder from downstairs" leads to a similar expectation as (3a), while
\Give the man downstairs the red le folder" leads to a similar expectation as (3b). Haas 31],
citing examples such as \Pick up the book behind you", points out a problem with indexical
descriptions such as \the book behind you". A listener must decide whether such descriptions
are to be grounded before they act { in this case, so that it makes sense to turn around to see
the book in order to pick it up { or whether they must act on the description as given.)
In addition to expectations concerning the location of an object satisfying a particular description, an agent may also develop expectations concerning the particular description that
needs to be satised. Here, an instruction like \Open the paint can" is more illustrative than
\Get the book". An agent who simply seeks to ground the expression \the paint can" in its
current situation may identify several objects of type \paint can". On the other hand, an agent
who expects to be able to open the referent of \the paint can" will seek to ground a more specic
expression such as \the closed paint can" or \the paint can that needs opening".5

5 Conclusion
The central theme of this special issue is \principled characterizations of agent-environment
interactions". What we have tried to characterize in this short position paper are ways in which
agents' understanding and use of instructions can complement what they can derive from the
environment in which they act, lessons we have learned from attempting a complete vertical
integration from Natural Language instructions to animated human gures. We have focussed
on two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior { their intentions and their expectations {
and shown how Natural Language in the form of instructions provides a source of such attitudes
in ways that complement the environment. We have also made the point that instructions can
require more than one context of interpretation. Thus agents' understanding of instructions will
evolve as their activity progresses. Understanding instructions is thus not a one-shot process
5 This is similar, in some ways, to Haddock's \the rabbit in the hat" example 30] in which the phrase as a
whole may refer uniquely in a context, even though neither of its component noun phrases (\the rabbit" and
\the hat") do. Haddock's solution makes use of constraint satisfaction, the \in" relation constraining possible
rabbit referents to ones that are in hats and possible hat referents to ones that contain rabbits.
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that occurs entirely prior to activity. Language understanding is not just something that takes
place \at the front end".
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